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PROBLEMS ASCERTAINING THE BARE MEANING OF
STATUTES REGULATING ADULT ENTERTAINMENT: THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FALLS BACK ON THE SECONDARY
EFFECTS DOCTRINE IN RANCH HOUSE, INC. v. AMERSON
I. INTRODUCTION
"It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every
activity a person undertakes ... but such a kernel is not sufficient to
bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment."'
One such activity that courts have examined in light of the First
Amendment is nude dancing.2 Although nude dancing has re-
ceived some First Amendment protection, it has also been subject
to laws that restrict it and that have often been upheld as constitu-
tional. 3 This two-sided treatment of nude dancing has blurred the
line between what is protected and what is not protected. 4
Accordingly, resolving the constitutionality of state and local
laws that regulate nude dancing has developed into a complex and
difficult task for courts. 5 In this evolving analysis, courts have
looked to the language of the statute or ordinance at issue and its
1. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(quoting City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)). For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's decision in Barnes, see infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opin-
ion) (upholding ordinance regulating public nudity); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566, 569-
71 (upholding statute regulating nude dancing while acknowledging First Amend-
ment protection); Sammy's of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993, 997-98
(11th Cir. 1998) (finding ordinance prohibiting nude dancing in places selling
liquor does not offend First Amendment); Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40
F.3d 129, 135-36 (6th Cir. 1994) (striking down ordinance banning all public
nudity).
3. See Pap's, 529 U.S. at 289, 302 (recognizing First Amendment protection for
nude dancing despite upholding ordinance regulating public nudity). For an ex-
planation of the decision in Pap's, see infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
4. See Pap's, 529 U.S. at 322-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing Court's re-
striction of activity based on harmful secondary effects has grave implications for
First Amendment jurisprudence); see also Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech
Analysis After Renton, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1904, 1920-21 (1989) (discussing confusion
surrounding types of nude dancing restrictions).
5. See Alan J. Howard, Wen Can The Moral Majority Rule?: The Real Dilemma at
The Core of The Nude Dancing Cases, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 897, 897-98 (2000) (discuss-
ing complex issue in Barnes of statute's constitutionality in banning public nudity);
Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, Topless or Bottomless Dancing or Similar Conduct as Of-
fense, 49 A.L.R.3d 1084, 1087-88 (1973) (explaining difficulty of determining First
Amendment protection for nude dancing).
(387)
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legislative history. 6 This analysis can be complicated, as the legisla-
tive purpose in enacting the law may not always be evident. 7 Re-
cently, the Eleventh Circuit engaged in this analysis when it
addressed the constitutionality of two regulatory provisions in
Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson.8 In Ranch House, the owners of an
adult entertainment establishment challenged the constitutionality
of two provisions that banned the display of nudity for entertain-
ment purposes and restricted the location of nude entertainment
establishments. 9 The Eleventh Circuit held that the legislative pur-
pose of one of the statutes was unclear, and remanded the case to
the lower court to determine its constitutionality. 10
This Note questions the Eleventh Circuit's decision to remand
the issue of the statute's constitutionality. Specifically, this Note dis-
cusses whether the court gave too much deference to the Alabama
Legislature and reviews the Eleventh Circuit's holding and ratio-
nale in reaching its decision." Section II of this Note provides the
underlying facts of Ranch House, while Section III details the com-
plex legal background of First Amendment jurisprudence as-ap-
plied to adult entertainment. 12 Section IV examines the Eleventh
Circuit's reasoning for its holding in Ranch House, and Section V
critiques the court's reluctance to decide whether the regulations at
issue were constitutional in light of prior case law.13 Finally, Section
VI evaluates the possible ramifications of the court's decision in
Ranch House. 14
6. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968) (evaluating legisla-
tors' statements in light of statute's language to determine law's purpose); Co-
lacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 552 (9th Cir. 1998) (examining ordinance's
face, effect, facts surrounding its enactment and legislature's purpose in adopting
ordinance); see also Barbre, supra note 5, at 1088-89 (discussing idea that courts
find statutes vague by looking at their language).
7. See SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir. 1988) (rec-
ognizing difficulty of determining actual purposes of zoning regulations).
8. 238 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2001).
9. See id. at 1276.
10. See id. at 1280-84, 1288.
11. For a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's rationale in Ranch House, see
infra notes 98-138 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the facts in Ranch House, see infra notes 15-24 and
accompanying text. For an examination of the background of First Amendment
jurisprudence as-applied to adult entertainment, see infta notes 25-97 and accom-
panying text.
13. For a discussion of the court's rationale in Ranch House, see infra notes 98-
138 and accompanying text. For a critique of that rationale, see infra notes 139-69
and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the potential impact of the Eleventh Circuit's holding
in Ranch House, see infra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 9: p. 387
2
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol9/iss2/6
REGULATING ADULT ENTERTAINMENT
II. FACTS OF RANCH HousE
In 1998, the Alabama Legislature amended the Alabama Crimi-
nal Code by including two additional statutory provisions aimed at
regulating adult entertainment establishments.1 5 Section 200.11
bans the display of nudity by a business establishment for entertain-
ment purposes. 16 Included separately, section 200.5(4) prohibits
the operation of an "adult-oriented enterprise within 1,000 feet of a
church, place of worship ... private residence, or any other place
frequented by minors."1 7
Since 1993, Plaintiff Ranch House, Inc. owned an establish-
ment that offered nude female dancing in Calhoun County, Ala-
bama.18 The business was located in an unincorporated area of
Calhoun County, and a single-family residence was within 1,000
feet. 19 Before sections 200.11 and 200.5(4) became effective,
Ranch House brought suit against Defendants Calhoun County
Commission and Sheriff Amerson in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama.2 0 Ranch House chal-
15. See Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson, 238 F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citing ALA. CODE §§ 13A-12-200.5(4), 200.11 (Supp. 2001), imposing criminal lia-
bility for display of materials harmful to minors and objectionable performances).
16. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.11 (Supp. 2001). Section 200.11 states:
It shall be unlawful for any business establishment or any private club to
show or allow to be shown for entertainment purposes the human male
or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque
covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully
opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or
the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. A
violation of this section shall be a Class C felony.
Id.
17. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.5(4) (Supp. 2001). Section 200.5(4) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to operate an adult bookstore, adult
movie house, adult video store, or other form of adult-only enterprise
within 1,000 feet of a church, place of worship, church bookstore, public
park, public housing project, daycare center, public or private school, col-
lege, recreation center, skating rink, video arcade, public swimming pool,
private residence, or any other place frequented by minors. Any person
who violates this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand
dollars ($10,000) and may also be imprisoned in the county jail for not
more than one year.
Id.
18. See Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1298 (N.D. Ala.
1998). The establishment, known as the Platinum Club, was not licensed to sell
alcohol in connection with the dancing. See id. Ranch House owned a bar called
the Platinum Sports Bar, which was located next to the Platinum Club and was
licensed to sell beer and wine. See id.
19. See Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184 (N.D. Ala.
2001) (noting Ranch House fell within parameters of statute).
20. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1276. Ranch House also moved for a prelimi-
nary injunction against the enforcement of the statutes. See id. Upon the parties'
2002]
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lenged the two statutes as unconstitutional under the First Amend-
ment.2 1 The district court upheld the statutes and dismissed Ranch
House's complaint.2 2 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that
the defendants did not prove that section 200.11's purpose was to
prevent the harmful secondary effects associated with nude danc-
ing.23 Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment
and remanded to allow the defendants a chance to give an ade-
quate evidentiary showing of the statute's purpose.2 4
III. BACKGROUND
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech." 25 However, the United
States Supreme Court has determined that there are limitations on
this freedom. 26 Specifically, the Court has established boundaries
for First Amendment protection by holding that certain speech can
be regulated depending on its content.27 This concept of First
stipulation, the district court consolidated the hearing for the preliminary injunc-
tion with a trial on the merits. See id. The district court then conducted a bench
trial with oral argument by counsel. See id. at 1276-77.
21. See Ranch House, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 1298. Ranch House argued that section
200.11 was a content-based restriction on nude dancing, which is protected expres-
sion under the First Amendment. See id. It also contended that section 200.5(4)
facially violated the First Amendment because it was "overbroad, vague and with-
out proper foundation." See id.
22. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1277. The district court first determined that
section 200.11 was a content-neutral restriction designed to combat the secondary
effects of nude dancing. See id. The court then applied intermediate scrutiny to
determine section 200.11's constitutionality. See id. (applying test set forth in
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). The district court concluded that
section 200.11 survived intermediate scrutiny because the statute did not "unrea-
sonably diminish the expressive content of nude dancing." Id. The court also de-
termined that section 200.5(4) was facially valid and not overbroad or vague. See
id.
23. See id. at 1284. The court also left open the issue of section 200.5(4)'s
constitutionality for the district court. See id. at 1287.
24. See id. at 1288. The court also continued the injunction granted upon
motion by Ranch House before the appeal. See id. The injunction prohibited the
enforcement of the statutes with respect to Ranch House's businesses. See id.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has determined that First
Amendment guarantees are extended to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding freedom
of speech and press extended to states through Fourteenth Amendment).
26. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1919) (restricting free
speech and establishing Justice Holmes' "clear and present danger" doctrine). In
Schenck, Justice Holmes set forth a test for the permissible punishment of speech.
See id. at 52. Under the test, speech could be punished if the words are used so "as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent." Id.
27. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (estab-
lishing modem doctrine for free speech analysis). In Brandenburg, the Court
[Vol. 9: p. 387
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Amendment "speech" has been extended to include certain types
of expressive conduct.28 For example, the Court held that the
burning of the American Flag amounted to expressive conduct and
could be permissible conduct if burned as a political statement.29
The Court has given similar treatment to nude dancing, entitling it
to some protection under the First Amendment. 30
Because the Supreme Court has granted nude dancing only
limited First Amendment protection, state and local governments
may enact legislation that restricts adult entertainment. 1 In order
to determine whether these restrictions violate First Amendment
guarantees, courts must engage in a comprehensive analysis. 32
struck down an Ohio statute that forbade the advocacy of violence "as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform." Id. at 448. The Court modified Jus-
tice Holmes' test by developing a new test for restricting free speech. See id. at 447.
Under the modified test, speech could be proscribed only when it is "directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action." Id.; see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-20 (1973) (finding
obscene materials unprotected and establishing test for obscenity); Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U.S. 15, 26-27 (1971) (holding offensive language protected by First
Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942) (hold-
ing "fighting words" unprotected class of speech under First Amendment); Note,
supra note 4, at 1905-06 (explaining analysis courts use to determine what content
can be regulated).
28. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (ex-
plaining symbolism can be effective way to express ideas); see also United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (establishing basic analysis for restricting
expressive conduct).
29. See Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (declaring flag burning to
be expressive conduct protected by First Amendment); see also Spence v. Washing-
ton, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974) (holding act of displaying flag with peace sign
attached was protected by First Amendment); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 369-70 (1931) (holding act of waiving red flag in public place symbol of oppo-
sition to government to be protected by First Amendment); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-3, 794-804 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing types of
conduct found protected by First Amendment).
30. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (plurality opin-
ion). In Barnes, the Court concluded that nude dancing was expressive conduct
marginally within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment. See id. The
Court, therefore, awarded nude dancing some protection as free expression. See
id.; see also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (recogniz-
ing First Amendment protection for nude dancing).
31. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567-68 (permitting state restriction on nude danc-
ing); Carol A. Crocca, Annotation, Validity of Ordinances Restricting Location of "Adult
Entertainment" or Sex-Oriented Businesses, 10 A.L.R.5th 538, 553-55 (1993) (discussing
First Amendment jurisprudence for zoning ordinances regulating adult
businesses).
32. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (providing required judicial analysis for First
Amendment protection of expressive conduct); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 50-54 (1987) (discussing approaches courts use
to determine protection for content-based and content-neutral restrictions); Susan
H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 615,
2002]
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A. First Amendment Free Expression Analysis
The first question courts must address when evaluating a law's
constitutionality under the First Amendment is whether the law is
intended to regulate an activity because of its content.33 If a regula-
tion seeks to suppress free expression because of the message con-
veyed, it is considered "content-based" and is subject to a more
demanding level of scrutiny.3 4 The government must then show a
compelling interest, and the regulation must be narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest.35 If the regulation's purpose is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression, then the regulation is consid-
ered "content-neutral" and is subject to a less stringent standard.36
Once a court has determined whether the law is content-based
or content-neutral, the appropriate test must then be applied.3 7 In
United States v. O'Brien,38 the Supreme Court set forth a test that is
used by courts to determine whether laws regulating free expres-
sion are constitutional.3 9 Under this test, a regulation conforms
621 (1991) (discussing variety of tests used in First Amendment content distinction
analysis).
33. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77 (requiring examination of law's underlying
purpose),
34. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403 (explaining rationale for holding law restrict-
ing flag desecration content-based and inconsistent with First Amendment). In
Johnson, the Court determined that a Texas statute prohibiting flag burning was
related to the suppression of free expression (i.e. content-based) and was subject
to "the most exacting scrutiny." Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
321 (1988)); see also Ofer Raban, Content-Based, Secondary Effects, and Expressive Con-
duct: What in the World Do They Mean (and What Do They Mean to the United States
Supreme Court)?, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. 551, 553-55 (2000) (defining content-based
regulations as aiming at communicative impact of speech); Stone, supra note 32, at
47-48 (discussing idea that content-based restrictions on valued speech are often
struck down regardless of test used).
35. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000).
In Playboy, the Supreme Court struck down a federal law that regulated adult pro-
gramming on cable television. See id. at 827. The Court found that the law was
content-based because it was focused only on the impact the adult programming
would have on its listeners. See id. at 811-12 (citing Boos, 485 U.S. at 321). Accord-
ingly, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the law and found that the law was not
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest because a less re-
strictive alternative was available. See id. at 816-17.
36. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403 (discussing standard set forth in United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)); Stone, supra note 32, at 48-50 (explaining
content-neutral restrictions limit expression without aiming at communicative im-
pact of message).
37. See Note, supra note 4, at 1905-06 (discussing appropriate tests to be ap-
plied for content-based and content-neutral regulations); Stone, supra note 32, at
47-50 (explaining differences between content-based and content-neutral
regulations).
38. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
39. See id. at 377 (explaining method of reviewing laws restricting First
Amendment freedoms).
[Vol. 9: p. 387
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with the First Amendment if: 1) it is within the constitutional power
of the government; 2) it furthers an important governmental inter-
est; 3) the government's interest is not related to suppressing ex-
pression; and 4) the restriction is no greater than necessary to
further the interest. 40 Applying this test, the Court upheld a statute
that prohibited the mutilation of Selective Service registration cer-
tificates.41 The Court later determined that the O'Brien test is simi-
lar to the test for time, place and manner restrictions. 42
Laws that are not related to the suppression of expression but
instead restrict the time, place and manner of the expression have
often been upheld as constitutional. 43 A time, place and manner
regulation is constitutionally valid provided that it: 1) is content-
neutral; 2) is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest; and 3) leaves open ample alternative channels for
communication. 4 4
40. See id. (setting forth four-part test for analyzing constitutionality of regula-
tions restricting free expression). This standard is less stringent than strict scrutiny
and is used for content-neutral regulations. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S.
277, 285 (2000) (plurality opinion) (holding statute requiring nude dancers to
wear "G-strings" content-neutral and subject to O'Brien test). This analysis is often
referred to as the intermediate scrutiny analysis. See 16A Am. JUR. 2D Constitutional
Law § 460 (1998).
41. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 385 (holding statute justified in suppressing con-
duct at issue under four-part test). The Court reasoned that the Government had
a substantial interest in restricting the destruction of Selective Service certificates.
See id. at 382. Also, the interest was limited to the non-communicative aspect of
O'Brien's conduct; thus, it was unrelated to the suppression of expression. See id.
Finally, the Court found that the statute was a narrow means of protecting the
interest, because no other alternative means were available to the Government. See
id.
42. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984)(noting time, place and manner restriction standard differs little from O'Brien
test). In Clark, the National Park Service issued a permit to the Community for
Creative Non-Violence ("CCNV") to allow it to conduct demonstrations in two na-
tional parks in Washington, D.C. See id. at 291-92. CCNV wished to sleep over-
night in tents as part of the demonstration, but the National Park Service denied
this request because a regulation prohibited sleeping in those areas. See id. at 292.
CCNV challenged the regulation, but the Court upheld It as a valid time, place and
manner regulation. See id. at 298-99. The Court noted that the outcome would be
the same under both the O'Brien test and the time, place and manner standard. See
id.
43. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725-26 (2000) (holding statute restrict-
ing protests within 100 feet of health care facility valid time, place and manner
regulation); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994) (up-
holding injunction creating thirty-six-foot buffer zone between abortion protesters
and clinic because it "burden [ed] no more speech than necessary"); Int'l Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) (holding regulation
restricting expression in non-public forum need only be reasonable and not means
to restrict to restrict expression over disagreement with speaker's viewpoint).
44. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (setting forth
test for time, place and manner regulations). In Ward, a New York City law regu-
2002]
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When challenging these nude dancing restrictions, parties may
assert that they are either facially unconstitutional or unconstitu-
tional as-applied to them.45 In a facial challenge, parties may allege
that these laws are either overbroad or vague and therefore uncon-
stitutional. 46 A law may be struck down as overbroad if it effectively
regulates both unprotected and protected conduct.4 7 A law is im-
permissibly vague when "men of common intelligence must neces-
sarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 48
In sum, the analysis of regulations that distinguish between
nude and clothed entertainment primarily consists of the applica-
tion of the O'Brien intermediate level of scrutiny test, so long as the
regulation is not content-based, but rather is justified without refer-
ence to speech. 49 To determine whether a regulation's purpose
lated the volume of musical performances at concerts in Central Park. See id. at
784-85. The Supreme Court upheld the law as a valid time, place and manner
regulation of expression. See id. at 803. The Court determined that the regulation
was content-neutral because it was unrelated to the content of the regulated
speech. See id. at 792. Also, the Court found the regulation to be narrowly tailored
to serve the city's interest of protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise, because
the regulation served that interest in a direct and effective way. See id. at 796-800.
Finally, the Court explained that the regulation left open ample alternative chan-
nels of communication because it did not aim at banning any given manner of
expression. See id. at 802.
45. See Ward v. County of Orange, 217 F.3d 1350, 1356 (11th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1149 (2001) (upholding zoning ordinance requiring club owner to
obtain license to be facially constitutional time, place and manner regulation but
remanding to allow club owner to bring as-applied challenge).
46. See id. at 1353-57. In Orange, the owner of a "swimsuit club" argued that
the Orange County Adult Entertainment Code, which required all adult perform-
ance establishments to obtain an adult entertainment license, was unconstitutional
both facially and as-applied. See id. at 1352. Addressing the facial challenge, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's finding that the ordinance was a valid
time, place and manner regulation. See id. at 1353-54. The Eleventh Circuit re-
manded the issue of whether the as-applied challenge was ripe, because the owner
never applied for a license. See id. at 1356. The Eleventh Circuit maintained that
in order for an as-applied challenge to be ripe, "a county official 'with sufficient
authority must have rendered a decision regarding' the party's proposal." Id.
(quoting Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 590 (11th Cir.
1997)).
47. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1987) (striking down as
overbroad ordinance making it unlawful to interrupt police officer in midst of
duties).
48. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (striking down law
regulating wage rates because statute was vague in defining meaning of "current
rate of wages" and "locality").
49. See Sammy's of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993, 998 (11th Cir.
1998) (upholding ordinance prohibiting nude dancing in places that sell liquor).
In Sammy's, the court applied the O'Brien intermediate level of scrutiny test to the
secondary effects analysis of City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. See 140 F.3d at
1998. For a full discussion of the Renton decision and the secondary effects doc-
trine, see infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. The court found that the ordi-
nance at issue was aimed at the harmful secondary effects of nude dancing in
[Vol. 9: p. 387
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was unrelated to expression or solely directed at suppressing the
expression, courts will review the full record to find the legislative
intent.50
B. Laws Regulating Adult Entertainment
Although numerous laws exist that affect adult entertainment,
two types of laws that impact the protection given to adult en-
tertainment are zoning laws and laws that restrict obscene perform-
ances.51 These laws have been generally upheld as valid exercises of
police power, designed to provide for the public's health, safety and
welfare.5 2
1. Zoning Laws
Zoning laws generally restrict the location of adult businesses
by imposing spacing requirements between these businesses and
other premises. 53 Although not required by the Constitution, these
laws may include amortization periods or grandfather clauses that
allow existing, non-conforming businesses a chance to conform to
places selling alcohol because the preamble of the ordinance explicitly stated that
the combination of the two "encourage[d] undesirable behavior and [was] not in
the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare." Sammy's, 140 F.3d at 997.
50. See Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 552 (9th Cir. 1998). The
court in Colacurcio stated that in order to determine a statute's purpose, it would
"rely on all 'objective indicators of intent,' including the 'face of the statute, the
effect of the statute, comparison to prior law, facts surrounding enactment, the
stated purpose, and the record of proceedings.'" Id. (quoting City of Las Vegas v.
Foley, 747 F.2d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1984)).
51. For a comprehensive discussion of zoning laws, see infra notes 53-71 and
accompanying text. For an in-depth discussion of obscenity laws, see infra notes
72-97 and accompanying text.
52. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality deci-
sion) (noting police authority to uphold public indecency statutes); Young v. Am.
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71-73 (1976) (concluding cities may enact zoning
ordinances to preserve character of neighborhoods); Crocca, supra note 31, at 554
(noting zoning regulations as valid exercises of police power); see also Brian J. Pol-
lock, Note, The Government May Institute a Total Ban on Public Nudity in Order to
Combat the Secondary Effects Associated With Adult Entertainment Establishments-City of
Erie v. Pap's A.M., 120 S.Ct. 1382 (2000), 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 151, 161-63
(2000) (discussing zoning ordinances and outright bans on display of nudity).
53. See Crocca, supra note 31, at 553 (explaining general purpose of zoning
ordinances as restricting location of adult businesses). Zoning ordinances are a
device that state and local governments can use to regulate nude dancing. See Lisa
Malmer, Comment, Nude Dancing and The First Amendment, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 1275,
1295-96 (1991). Traditionally, zoning laws are only valid if the government can
show that its interference with private land use is substantially related to the fur-
therance of the public's general welfare. See id. at 1296.
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the zoning requirements. 5 4 First Amendment rights are implicated
when a zoning law restricts the location of an adult establishment. 55
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,56 a zoning ordinance
restricted the operation of adult movie theaters or similar adult es-
tablishments within 1,000 feet of a residential area.5 7 In a plurality
opinion, the Supreme Court determined that it was acceptable to
distinguish between theaters showing adult-oriented films and
those showing other films. 58 Consequently, the Court upheld the
ordinance as constitutional because it was not aimed at suppressing
free expression, but instead at preserving the character of Detroit's
neighborhoods.5 9
Conversely, in Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim,60 the Court
struck down a zoning ordinance that prohibited the display of live
nude dancing in all establishments within the borough. 6' The
Court found that the ordinance was not a reasonable time, place
and manner restriction because the borough did not identify its in-
54. See David Vincent, Inc. v. Broward County, 200 F.3d 1325, 1332 n.lI (11th
Cir. 2000) (noting Constitution does not require grandfather clauses, but courts
have upheld regulations with amortization periods). A grandfather clause allows
an existing, non-conforming business to remain despite the requirements of the
ordinance. SeeJay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity ofProvisionsforAmortization of Non-
conforming Uses, 8 A.L.R.5th 391, 406 (1992) (discussing conflicts between individ-
ual's interests and society's interests with non-conforming uses). An amortization
period in a zoning ordinance allows a grace period for non-conforming uses to
adjust to the zoning requirements. See id. at 406-07. Courts look at the burden on
the existing non-conforming businesses to determine whether the amortization pe-
riod is reasonable. See Ebel v. City of Corona, 767 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1985).
55. See Crocca, supra note 31, at 554-55. Courts must decide whether zoning
ordinances violate the First Amendment because adult entertainment is entitled to
some First Amendment protection. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566.
56. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
57. See id. at 52. Detroit adopted restrictive ordinances in response to the
increase in the number of adult establishments in certain areas. See id. at 54-55.
Such ordinances, which were prompted by a finding from the Detroit Common
Council, were intended to address the problems of adversely affected property val-
ues and increased crime. See id.
58. See id. at 70-72. The Court felt that although the First Amendment does
not tolerate the total suppression of erotic expression, society has a lesser interest
in protecting this kind of expression when compared to other protected expres-
sion, such as untrammeled political debate. See id. at 70.
59. See id. at 72-73. In his opinion, Justice Stevens wrote that the "city's inter-
est in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded
high respect." Id. at 71. The Court added that the ordinance was justified because
the city relied on the studies performed by the Detroit Common Council. See id.
60. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
61. See id. at 76. In Schad, the owners of an adult bookstore were convicted for
violating Mount Ephraim's zoning ordinance by providing a coin-operated ma-
chine that allowed viewers to watch a nude dancer perform. See id. at 62-64.
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terests for excluding the entertainment.62 Had the borough shown
that the live entertainment was incompatible with the normal activ-
ity of the commercial zone, the ordinance may have been vali-
dated. 63 Nonetheless, the Court concluded by noting that the
borough did not leave open adequate alternative channels of com-
munication because the ordinance excluded both obscene and
non-obscene nude entertainment. 64
A few years after Schad, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc.,65 the Court dealt with a zoning ordinance similar to the one in
Young.66 The Court found that the ordinance was a content-neutral
regulation aimed at furthering an important governmental interest
by preventing the harmful secondary effects that adult movie thea-
ters may have on neighborhoods. 67 The Court explained that the
city did not need to conduct studies to prove the ordinance was
aimed at these negative secondary effects, but the city could reason-
ably rely on the findings of other cities. 68 The Court concluded
62. See id. at 73-75. The Court first noted that the ordinance "prohibit[ed] a
wide range of expression that has long been held to be within the protections of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 65. The Court then distinguished
the case from the Young holding, wherein the city had presented sufficient evi-
dence to justify its regulation of First Amendment guarantees. See id. at 71-72.
63. See id. at 75. The Court explained that to determine the reasonableness of
these regulations, the question was whether the expression was basically incompati-
ble with the normal activity of the commercial zone. See id. (citing Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972)). According to the Court, this question
could not be answered because the borough failed to produce evidence showing
this expression was incompatible with the normal activity of the area. See id.
64. See id. at 75-76. The Court again cited Young because in that case the city
only restricted obscene materials by merely dispersing them, not by banning them
altogether.- See id. at 71-72.
65. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
66. See id. at 43. In Renton, the zoning ordinance prohibited adult movie thea-
ters from being located within 1,000 feet of family residences, churches, parks or
schools. See id. Cf Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (uphold-
ing ordinance prohibiting adult theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any
other regulated uses or within 500 feet of residential area).
67. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48, 50-51. The Court answered the question of
whether the Renton ordinance was aimed at serving a substantial governmental
interest and allowed for reasonable alternative avenues of communication in the
affirmative. See id. at 50. But cf Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988). In Boos,
the Court held that a statute prohibiting the display of any sign within 500 feet of a
foreign embassy, which would tend to bring the foreign government into "public
disrepute," was 1) content-based and 2) not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial
governmental interest. See id. at 321, 329.
68. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52. Because the City of Renton did not conduct
studies specifically relating to the city's problems, the appellate court ruled that
the city's justifications were speculative. See id. at 50. The Supreme Court felt that
requiring the city to conduct new studies would impose an "unnecessarily rigid
burden of proof" on the city. See id.
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that the ordinance left reasonable alternative avenues of communi-
cation, and accordingly upheld the ordinance as constitutional. 69
The Renton decision, along with the Schad decision, provided
arguments for and against the use of zoning ordinances to restrict
expression after the plurality in Young.70 Subsequently, many cir-
cuit courts have disagreed on the constitutionality of similar zoning
ordinances as time, place and manner restrictions v.7
2. Obscenity Laws
Owners of adult entertainment establishments and nude danc-
ers may be prosecuted under laws that prohibit the display of ob-
scene conduct.7 2 These laws typically restrict either the indecent
exposure of particular body parts, or other lewd or obscene
behavior. 7 3
The Supreme Court decided that obscenity may be regulated
because of its "constitutionally proscribable content," so long as the
government does not discriminate against the obscenity solely be-
cause of a disagreement with its content.7 4 In the past, the Su-
69. See id. at 53-54. The Court noted that because the ordinance left open
520 acres of the land area in Renton for the business owners to use, it left open
reasonable alternative avenues of communication. See id. at 53.
70. See Note, supra note 4, at 1911 (noting amount of protection given to
adult entertainment after Schad and Renton decisions remains unclear).
71. See, e.g., Ambassador Books & Video, Inc. v. City of Little Rock, 20 F.3d
858, 861-63 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding ordinance that expressly addressed harmful
secondary effects of adult businesses complied with First Amendment); Int'l
Eateries of Am., Inc. v. Broward County, 941 F.2d 1157, 1161-65 (11th Cir. 1991)
(finding ordinance similar to one in Renton satisfied Supreme Court's standard set
forth in Renton); SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1273, 1276 (5th Cir.
1988) (upholding ordinance imposing licensing and zoning requirements on
adult businesses).
72. See Barbre, supra note 5, at 1088-90 (discussing ordinances prohibiting
obscene or indecent exposure).
73. See id. at 1088-89. According to Barbre, nude dancers have been prose-
cuted under two types of laws: 1) laws that prohibit the indecent or obscene expo-
sure of a person's body parts, and 2) laws that prohibit lewd or obscene conduct
without reference to the person's body parts. See id. Barbre further explains that
the question under both types of laws is whether the dancer's performance
amounts to obscenity. See id. at 1089. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's test
for obscenity, see infra note 77 and accompanying text.
74. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992). In R.A.V, the
Supreme Court struck down a law prohibiting hate speech based on race, religion,
color, creed or gender because it was impermissibly content-based. See id. at 381.
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia wrote that if the government discriminates
against an entire class of speech, such as obscenity, solely because the content is
proscribable (e.g. fighting words), then this reason is neutral enough to justify
excluding that speech from First Amendment protection. See id. at 388. The gov-
ernment, however, may not prohibit speech solely based on the idea or subject
addressed. See id. at 393-94. Justice Scalia explained that states may "choose to
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preme Court consistently held that obscenity was not entitled to
First Amendment protection. 75 In Miller v. California,76 the Su-
preme Court developed the modern definition of obscenity.77 Gen-
erally, if material is obscene, states may prohibit the display of that
material to protect the public health, safety and morals, so long as
the regulation or prohibition is not content-based. 7
The Supreme Court has decided that nude dancing is not un-
protected obscene conduct, but rather is entitled to some protec-
tion. 79  In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,80 the Supreme Court
determined that nude dancing is expressive conduct that margin-
prohibit only that obscenity which is the most patently offensive in its prurience -
i.e., that which involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity. But it may
not prohibit, for example, only that obscenity which includes offensive political
messages." Id. at 388 (citation omitted).
75. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). In Roth, the Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of a criminal obscenity statute that prohib-
ited the mailing of obscene materials. See id. at 479 n.1. Roth challenged the con-
stitutionality of the statute following conviction. See id. at 480. After holding that
obscenity is not protected under the First Amendment, the Court set forth the test
for obscenity. See id. at 485, 489. The question to be asked was "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Id. at 489.
76. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
77. See id. at 24-25. In Miller, the defendant engaged in a mass-mailing cam-
paign to promote the sale of books containing adult material. See id. at 16. He was
convicted under a California statute for knowingly distributing obscene matter. See
id. at 16-17. In reviewing the conviction, the Supreme Court redefined the stan-
dard for determining whether material is obscene. See id. at 24-25. The Court
began by citing the test set forth in Roth and then developed the test for obscenity
to be:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards," would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
78. See RA. V., 505 U.S. at 393-94 (explaining government may proscribe ob-
scenity but not solely because of disagreement with message conveyed); Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion) (citing Roth to
explain that state legislatures may act to protect interests of order and morality);
Sammy's of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993, 995-97 (11th Cir. 1998)
(explaining government may prohibit nude dancing where liquor is sold because
valid exercise of police power).
79. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565-66 (declaring nude dancing protected activity
under First Amendment); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plu-
rality opinion) (citing Barnes to declare nude dancing expressive conduct, al-
though merely being in state of nudity is not expressive). For a further discussion
of the Court's holding and rationale in Pap's, see infra notes 89-92 and accompany-
ing text.
80. 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion).
2002] 399
13
Schrack: Problems Ascertaining the Bare Meaning of Statutes Regulating Adu
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
400 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
ally comes within the scope of First Amendment protection.8 ' In
the plurality opinion, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a
public indecency statute that required nude dancers to wear "past-
ies" and "G-strings."82 The Court applied the O'Brien test to uphold
the statute as a justified attempt at furthering a substantial govern-
mental interest in protecting order and morality.8 3
In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter disagreed with the
plurality's assertion that the statute was justified in protecting soci-
ety's moral views, arguing that the statute was instead justified be-
cause it aimed at preventing the negative secondary effects of nude
dancing.8 4 Justice Scalia also concurred in the judgment, but wrote
separately to argue that the statute was justified because it was not
directed at the expression and, therefore, the First Amendment was
inapplicable.8 5 Writing for the dissent, Justice White argued that
the statute's requirements were directly aimed at suppressing free
81. See id. at 565-66. The Court stated that nude dancing is "expressive con-
duct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though ... only margin-
ally so." Id. at 566. The Court then determined the applicable question was what
level of protection should be afforded to the expressive conduct. See id; see also
Timothy M. Tesluk, Comment, Barnes v. Glen Theatre: Censorship? So What?, 42
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1103, 1105-06 (1992) (discussing Barnes decision and defin-
ing nude dancing as "symbolic speech").
82. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 563. In Barnes, two adult entertainment businesses
argued that an Indiana statute requiring dancers to wear "pasties" and "G-strings"
was an infringement on the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expres-
sion. See id. One business sold alcoholic beverages and desired to present totally
nude dancing, while the other was a bookstore that sold adult entertainment
through printed material, movie showings and nude performances seen through
glass panels in the store. See id. Both filed suit arguing that the statute's complete
ban on nudity was unconstitutional. See id. at 563-64. The district court ultimately
ruled for the defendants, but the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that the stat-
ute was an improper infringement on nude dancing, which was protected expres-
sive conduct under the First Amendment. See id. at 564-65.
83. See id. 567-68. In applying the O'Brien test, the Court first determined that
the statute was "within the constitutional power of the State" and was aimed at
"further[ing] a substantiaj governmental interest." Id. at 567. Next, the Court
found that the government's interest in protecting order and morality was unre-
lated to the suppression of expression. See id. at 569-70. Finally, the Court decided
that the statute was narrowly tailored to achieve the governmental interest because
the requirement that dancers wear the "pasties" and "G-strings" would not deprive
the dance of the message it conveys. See id. at 571-72.
84. See id. at 582 (Souter,J., concurring). Justice Souter opined that Indiana's
interest in preventing criminal activity was sufficient to satisfy the O'Brien test. See
id. at 583. He added that it did not matter that Indiana failed to articulate its
purpose in enacting the statute because the state did not need to show affirmative
evidence of its desire to prevent these negative effects. See id. at 582-85.
85. See id. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia felt that the regulation
was not subject to First Amendment scrutiny because it was a general regulation of
conduct not directed at protected expression. See id.
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expression; therefore, he asserted, the plurality was incorrect to up-
hold the statute as constitutional.8 6
Because no opinion in Barnes commanded a majority, lower
courts have had to determine the proper analysis to follow. 87 Many
circuit courts have decided to rely on Justice Souter's concurring
opinion because it was the narrowest of the four.88
Years after the Barnes decision, the Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of a statute banning public nudity in City of Erie
v. Pap's A.M. 89 In another plurality opinion, the Court recognized
that the ordinance placed a general ban on all nudity, regardless of
whether the nudity would have an expressive message. 90 As the
Court did in Barnes, it upheld the ordinance as a valid content-neu-
tral restriction because it targeted the harmful secondary effects of
adult entertainment establishments.91 Consequently, the Pap's
86. See id. at 592-93 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White argued that dancers
were required to wear the "pasties" and "G-strings" under the statute because of
the nature of the performances. See id. at 592. Therefore, he believed the statute
was related to the expression. See id. See also Tesluk, supra note 81, at 1121-22
(discussing negative implications Barnes has on free expression).
87. SeeJ & B Entm't, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 152 F.3d 362, 370 (5th Cir. 1998)
(debating which opinion in Barnes to use for ordinances banning public nudity).
88. See id. (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), because
holding of fragmented cases must be taken by members who concurred in narrow-
est grounds); Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 133-36 (6th Cir.
1994) (relying on Justice Souter's concurrence in Barnes to strike down as over-
broad public indecency ordinance that banned all public nudity); Int'l Eateries of
Am., Inc. v. Broward County, 941 F.2d 1157, 1160-61 (lth Cir. 1991) (adopting
Justice Souter's concurrence because narrowest and closest to secondary effects
analysis in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51 (1986)).
89. 529 U.S. 277, 282-83 (2000) (plurality opinion). In Pap's, the city of Erie,
Pennsylvania enacted a public-indecency ordinance that made it a summary of-
fense to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a "state of nudity." See id. at
283. Due to the ordinance, nude dancers were forced to wear "pasties" and "G-
strings." See id. at 284. A corporation that operated a nude dancing establishment
challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance and filed for a permanent injunc-
tion against its enforcement. See id.
90. See id. at 290 (citing Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568). The plurality also pointed to
the preamble of the ordinance that stated the regulation was adopted "for the
purpose of limiting a recent increase in nude live entertainment within the City,
which adversely impacts and threatens to impact on public health, safety and wel-
fare by providing an atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual harassment,... and
other deleterious effects." Id. The plurality agreed with the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's assertion that this language indicated that the ordinance was designed to
combat secondary effects. See id, at 290-92.
91. See id. at 296. The Court recognized that the ordinance "may place inci-
dental burdens on some protected speech," but opined that so long as the ordi-
nance was targeted at harmful secondary effects, then the ordinance was justified.
Id. at 295. Justice Souter altered his position in Barnes, arguing that the city did
not come forward with a proper showing of the purpose of the ordinance. See id.
at 316-17 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Pollock,
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holding extended the secondary effects analysis to allow complete
bans on conduct.9 2
Because the Pap's and Barnes decisions were plurality decisions,
the Court's future treatment of laws restricting nude dancing re-
mains unclear.9 3 Some circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit in BSA,
Inc. v. King County, have found that laws placing general bans on
public nudity are unconstitutional. 94 Additionally, in Triplett Grille,
Inc. v. City of Akron,95 the Sixth Circuit held that a public indecency
ordinance, similar to the one in Barnes, was facially unconstitutional
because Akron failed to show a link between nudity in non-adult
entertainment and harmful secondary effects resulting from that
nudity.96 Thus, the constitutionality of these adult entertainment
regulations turns on whether the government had a substantial in-
terest in enacting the regulation, apart from suppressing expres-
supra note 52, at 172-73 (discussing Souter's opinion concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
92. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 295-96. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Ste-
vens expressed his concern over the Court's use of the secondary effects doctrine
to allow a total ban on expression. See id. at 322-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He
believed that the holding "ha[d] the effect of swallowing whole a most fundamen-
tal principle of First Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 323.
93. See Ken Kimura, Note, A Legitimacy Model for The Interpretation of Plurality
Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1593, 1596 (1992). Kimura states:
The absence of a simple majority creates precedential uncertainty in plu-
rality decisions. This precedential uncertainty may be seen as a function
of three factors: (1) the difficulty in identifying a particular legal rule that
a numerical majority ofJustices support, (2) the difficulty in identifying a
particular outcome that is justified in light of a single legal rule, and (3)
the difficulty in explaining an adequate connection between the identi-
fied legal rule and the identified outcome.
Id.
94. See BSA, Inc. v. King County, 804 F.2d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
two ordinances prohibiting both obscene and non-obscene nude performances
substantially overbroad and unconstitutional).
95. 40 F.3d 129 (6th Cir. 1994).
96. See id. at 135. Demonstrating that the public indecency ordinance banned
all public nudity, including performances with literary, artistic or political value,
the Sixth Circuit quoted Justice Souter's concurring opinion:
It is difficult to see, for example, how the enforcement of Indiana's stat-
ute against nudity in a production of "Hair" or "Equus" somewhere other
than an "adult" theater would further the State's interest in avoiding
harmful secondary effects, in the absence of evidence that expressive
nudity outside the context of Renton-type adult entertainment was corre-
lated with such secondary effects.
Id. at 136 (Souter,J., concurring) (quoting Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S.
560, 585 n.2 (1991) (plurality opinion)). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that the city failed to show that expressive nudity was linked to harmful secondary
effects, and therefore, the court struck down the ordinance as substantially over-
broad. See id.
[Vol. 9: p. 387
16
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol9/iss2/6
REGULATING ADULT ENTERTAINMENT
sion, and whether there is a connection between the regulation and
the government interest.97
IV. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S RATIONALE IN RANCH HOUSE
In Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson,98 the Eleventh Circuit vacated
the district court's decision that two Alabama statutes, both placing
restrictions on adult entertainment establishments, were constitu-
tional and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 99
The court first addressed the constitutionality of section 13A-12-
200.11 of the Alabama Criminal Code ("section 200.11"), which
prohibited the display of nudity by a "business establishment ... for
entertainment purposes."100 The court then briefly discussed the
constitutionality of section 13A-12-200.5(4) of the Code ("section
200.5(4)"), which restricted the location of adult businesses.' 0'
A. Eleventh Circuit's Analysis of Section 200.11
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis of section 200.11's con-
stitutionality by deciding which level of scrutiny to apply. 10 2 To an-
swer that question, the court had to determine whether section
200.11 was content-based or content-neutral. 10 3 Ranch House ar-
gued that the statute was a content-based regulation aimed at sup-
pressing free expression, and therefore must be subject to strict
97. See Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164, 173 (3d Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (remanding to determine whether borough had interest to justify ordi-
nance). In Phillips, the court remanded the case because the borough filed no
answer showing its interest to justify the zoning ordinance at issue. See id. The
court noted that the borough had the burden of producing evidence to show that
it reasonably believed its interest would be achieved by enacting the ordinance. See
id.
98. 238 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2001).
99. See id. at 1288. Additionally, the court continued an existing injunction
that prohibited the enforcement of the statutes against Ranch House's businesses.
See id.
100. Id. at 1277, 1278-86 (quoting ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.11 (Supp. 2001)).
Sections 200.11 and 200.5(4) were recent amendments to the Alabama Anti-Ob-
scenity Enforcement Act. See id. at 1276.
101. See id. at 1286-88. For a discussion of the court's analysis of section
200.5(4)'s constitutionality, see infra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
102. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1278. The court noted that the level of
scrutiny in large part determines whether a statute is constitutional. See id.
103. See id. The court recognized that if the regulation was unrelated to the
suppression of expression, then the regulation would only have to satisfy the less
stringent O'Brien standard; conversely, if the regulation was related to the suppres-
sion of the expression, then the regulation would be subject to strict scrutiny. See
id. (citing City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 278 (2000) (plurality opinion)).
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scrutiny. 10 4 The defendants countered this assertion by arguing
that the statute was content-neutral and subject to the O'Brien inter-
mediate scrutiny standard because it was not targeted at the pro-
tected expression, but rather at the harmful secondary effects
associated with nude dancing. 105 The Eleventh Circuit decided that
even though section 200.11 did not appear content-neutral, it could
be considered content-neutral if there was a legislative purpose
other than suppressing the nude expression.106
In making this determination, the Eleventh Circuit pointed to
the secondary effects doctrine set forth in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc.,10 7 which maintains that a statute is not content-based
if it is concerned with preventing the harmful effects that a certain
message may have on its viewers.' 08 The Eleventh Circuit cited its
recent decision in Sammy's of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile'09 to fur-
ther illustrate how the secondary effects doctrine could validate a
statute that may appear content-based. 110 The court believed that
104. See id. at 1277-78. Ranch House argued that the statute would not only
fail strict scrutiny, but also intermediate scrutiny because the statute was over-
broad. See id. at 1278. The court noted that although Ranch House's arguments
appeared to be facial attacks, those arguments may have merit in the form of as-
applied challenges and brought as such on remand. See id. at 1277-78 n.2.
105. See id. The defendants did not make an argument that the statute could
withstand strict scrutiny. See id.
106. See id. at 1278-79. The court first cited a recent Supreme Court decision
to reiterate that a content-based regulation is present when the government aims
at suppressing the particular message at issue. See id. at 1278 (citing Hill v. Colo-
rado, 530 U.S. 703, 719-20 (2000)). The court then pointed out that even though
a statute may refer to the content of the expression, it is not content-based if the
government had some valid purpose other than suppressing the expression. See id.
107. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
108. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1279-80 (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-48).
According to the court, the secondary effects doctrine "is used to determine
whether a statute is content-based, by looking for a legislative purpose independent
of the legislature's hostility to the underlying message." Id. at 1280. In Renton, the
Supreme Court used the secondary effects doctrine to uphold a zoning ordinance
that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of
any residential zone, park, school or church. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-48. The
Court found that the ordinance was not directed at the content of films shown in
these theaters, but at the harmful secondary effects of the theaters on the sur-
rounding community. See id. at 47. For a further discussion of the Court's holding
and rationale in Renton, see supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
109. 140 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1998).
110. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1280 (citing Sammy's of Mobile, Ltd. v. City
of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993 (11 th Cir. 1998)). In Sammy's, the Eleventh Circuit upheld
an ordinance that outlawed the display of nude performances in establishments
licensed to sell liquor. See Sammy's, 140 F.3d at 998-99. The goal of the ordinance,
as stated in the preamble, was to avoid "undesirable behavior... not in the interest
of the public health, safety and welfare" and "disturbances associated with mixing
alcohol and nude dancing .. " Id. at 995. The court rejected the argument that
the ordinance was content-based because it referred to nude entertainment, stat-
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examining the language of the statutes in cases such as Renton and
Sammy's showed why section 200.11 was not content-based solely be-
cause it singled out nudity for entertainment purposes.'11
Accordingly, the court examined the record to ascertain the
Alabama Legislature's purpose in enacting the statute.11 2 In doing
so, the court found that there was not enough evidence to deter-
mine the legislature's actual purpose for restricting the display of
nudity for entertainment purposes. 1 3 The court noted that, at first
glance, the evidence suggested that section 200.11 was indeed con-
tent-based as Ranch House asserted.11 4
Seeking further to determine the legislature's intent, the court
first analyzed the text of section 200.11.115 It decided that the stat-
ute on its face appeared to not only expressly prohibit nudity at
adult-oriented establishments, but also nudity in theaters or other
establishments unrelated to adult entertainment. 16 The court also
found that the introductory section of the bill, which added section
200.11, neither referred to nude dancing, nor classified establish-
ments providing nude dancing as public nuisances.11 7 The court
added that the legislature separately included section 200.11 and
section 200.5(4), the zoning provision, and that separation of the
two provisions suggested that the legislature's purpose was not to
prevent secondary effects.' 18 Finally, the court considered the ex-
ing that the Supreme Court "does not equate reference to content with suppres-
sion of content." Id. at 998.
111. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1280. The Eleventh Circuit explained that if
a statute expressly targets a particular form of nudity, it is relevant but not disposi-
tive in assessing whether the statute intends to suppress expression. See id.
112. See id. at 1280-81. The court noted that the determination of a law's
particular purpose may be achieved through examination of "a wide variety of
materials, including the text of the statute, any preamble or express legislative find-
ings associated with it, legislative history, and studies and information of which
legislators were clearly aware." Id. at 1280 (citing Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163
F.3d 545, 552 (9th Cir. 1998)).
113. See id. at 1281. The court sought to determine whether the legislature's
purpose was to restrict the display of nudity for entertainment purposes because of
its disagreement with the message or to "ameliorate the perceived negative effects
of nude dancing venues on the safety, health, and welfare of the surrounding com-
munity." Id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 1281. The court again noted that the text of section 200.11
targeted nude entertainment and not other displays of nude expression. See id.
116. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1281 (noting statute's text did not demon-
strate legislative purpose to combat secondary effects).
117. See id. (finding no specific language in introductory section of bill sug-
gesting nude dancing constituted public nuisance).
118. See id. The court stated that even though the amended Act included a
zoning provision, which is commonly justified as combating secondary effects, this
2002]
19
Schrack: Problems Ascertaining the Bare Meaning of Statutes Regulating Adu
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
406 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
press legislative findings of section 200.11 and found the suggestion
that the legislature's purpose was to suppress the message conveyed
by nude dancing solely because of a disagreement with the
expression. 119
As a result, the court found that the defendants failed to pro-
duce evidence to support their secondary effects argument.120 The
court added that there was no precedent allowing a secondary ef-
fects argument to prevail without some indication that the legisla-
ture intended to prevent those effects.' 21 Furthermore, the court
inclusion would not necessarily mean that the legislature intended to battle secon-
dary effects through section 200.11. See id.
119. See id. at 1281-82 (citing 1998 Ala. Acts 98-467, § 1). The legislative find-
ings addressed by the court stated:
The Legislature of Alabama finds and declares:
(1) That in order to protect children from exposure to obscenity, prevent
assaults on the sensibilities of unwilling adults by the purveyor of obscene
material, and suppress the proliferation of "adult-only video stores,"
"adult bookstores," "adult movie houses," and "adult-only entertainment,"
the sale and dissemination of obscene material should be regulated with-
out impinging on the First Amendment rights of free speech by erecting
barriers to the open display of erotic and lascivious material.
(2) That the premises in which a violation of the Act occurs should be
declared a public nuisance.
Id. at 1282 (citing 1998 Ala. Acts 98-467, § 1). According to the court, the first
finding applied only to displays of obscenity and not to non-obscene nude en-
tertainment. See id. at 1281. The court believed that the second legislative finding
added little to the analysis because it declared establishments, such as Ranch
House, public nuisances due to their expression, but failed to mention their nega-
tive effects on the community. See id. at 1282. The court felt that these findings
weakened the secondary effects argument by the defendants. See id. at 1281-82.
120. See id. at 1282. The court believed that the defendants failed to offer any
legislative history or other record evidence because they believed they were not
required to make a showing of the legislature's purpose. See id. According to the
court, the defendants felt the court should rest on the assumption that the legisla-
ture's purpose was to prevent the negative effects these establishments would have
on the public's health, safety and welfare. See id.
121. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1282. The court compared various cases,
including Pap's and Renton, that support the proposition that some indication of
legislative intent exist to prevent secondary effects. See id. at 1282 n.4, 1284 (cita-
tions omitted). The court noted that although Justice Souter suggested in his
Barnes concurrence that a statute could be justified by secondary effects even
though its purpose was absent, he departed from this position in his Pap's concur-
rence; therefore, his position in Barnes did not support the defendants' argument.
See id. (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582 (1991) (plurality
opinion) (Souter, J., concurring) and City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 316
(2000) (plurality opinion) (Souter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
The court also believed the defendants' argument would permit a broad exception
to the rule that a statute discriminating against particular speech on its face must
be subject to strict scrutiny. See id. at 1283. Finally, the court explained that the
defendants' argument would undermine the rule that the Government bears the
burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions when restricting free expres-
sion. See id. (citing United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 816
(2000)).
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felt that allowing the defendants' argument to suffice would impose
no burden on the government to invoke the secondary effects doc-
trine and would lessen the level of scrutiny for laws restricting pro-
tected rights.' 22 The court, therefore, concluded that state actors
must point to some meaningful indication, which may be found in
the code's language or in the record of the legislative proceedings,
that the statute's purpose was to combat harmful secondary effects
of nude entertainment.
123
Consequently, the court held that the defendants must develop
an evidentiary foundation for their argument that section 200.11's
purpose was to combat secondary effects. 124 Accordingly, the court
decided to vacate the district court's judgment and remand the case
to allow the defendants an opportunity to meet this burden. 12 5
Although the court did not decide whether section 200.11
could survive intermediate scrutiny, the Eleventh Circuit suggested
that Ranch House had substantial arguments to make it difficult for
the statute to survive. 126 Specifically, the court found merit in
Ranch House's argument that section 200.11's restrictions were
greater than necessary to serve the government's interest because
122. See id. (concluding defendants' argument would permit broad proscrip-
tion of protected speech).
123. See id. The court compared this rationale with Renton, wherein the Su-
preme Court found that the district court's determination of the city's legislative
intent to prevent secondary effects was sufficient tojustify the ordinance at issue.
See id. (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
For a discussion of Renton, see supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. The
court felt that although this burden on the defendants was minimal, it was impor-
tant because the text of section 200.11 suggested that the Alabama Legislature's
intent was to suppress expression. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1283.
124. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1284 (remanding case to allow defendants to
provide evidentiary showing of statute's purpose).
125. See id. at 1284-86. The court had several reasons for remanding the case.
See id. at 1284. First, Ranch House would be minimally prejudiced from continued
delay in resolving its claim, provided that the court extend the existing injunction.
See id. Second, the district court did not have a factual basis for invoking the secon-
dary effects doctrine and remanding would allow one to be established. See id.
Third, courts have been willing to remand in situations involving similar statutes.
See id. Fourth, by remanding, the defendants could bring an as-applied challenge
along with the facial challenge. See id. Fifth, the court wanted to give the attorneys
representing Alabama an opportunity to be heard. See id.
126. See id. at 1285. The court first directed the district court on remand to
apply the O'Brien intermediate scrutiny test. See id. (citing United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) and Sammy's of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mo-
bile, 140 F.3d 993, 996 (11 th Cir. 1998)). For a complete discussion of the test set
forth in O'Brien, see supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. The court men-
tioned that Ranch House's arguments regarding the first three factors of the
O'Brien test "essentially dovetail" with its assertions concerning secondary effects,
especially because the defendants lacked a foundation for their position. See Ranch
House, 238 F.3d at 1285.
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the terms "business establishment" and "for entertainment pur-
poses" in the statute might include other non-adult establishments
displaying nudity for serious artistic purposes. 127 The court hesi-
tated to address the issue fully, leaving this task for the district court
to determine on remand. 128
B. Eleventh Circuit's Analysis of Section 200.5(4)
The Eleventh Circuit also briefly addressed the constitutional-
ity of section 200.5(4). 129 Ranch House argued that this zoning
provision was unconstitutional because it lacked an amortization
period or grandfather clause that allowed time to conform to the
zoning requirements.1 30 Defendants responded that an amortiza-
tion period was built into the statute.' 3 ' Although the court de-
cided not to rule on the constitutionality of section 200.5(4), it
engaged in a general analysis of zoning ordinances under the First
Amendment. i3 2
The Eleventh Circuit explained that courts treat zoning ordi-
nances that regulate adult entertainment as time, place and man-
ner restrictions. 133 The court then examined prior cases to show it
127. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1285. The court recognized that Ranch
House's argument that the statute was overbroad on its face was substantial. See id.
The court found that if the terms in the statute included for-profit establishments,
"then a for-profit theater's performance of the musical Hair or another play in
which nudity plays a prominent and stylistically meaningful role might well be con-
sidered a display of nudity by a business establishment for entertainment pur-
poses." Id. If this is the case, the court felt that the statute would be greater than
necessary to advance the state's interest and should be struck down. See id.
128. See id. at 1285-86 (indicating that both parties should have opportunity
to argue whether section 200.11 survives scrutiny).
129. See id. at 1286 (examining whether zoning provision violates First
Amendment).
130. See id. at 1286 (discussing Ranch House's argument against constitution-
ality of section 200.5(4)).
131. See id. The court noted that section 200.5(4)'s authorizing bill delayed
the effective date of the statute until "'the first day of the third month following its
passage and approval by the Governor, or its otherwise becoming law.'" Id. (quot-
ing 1998 Ala. Acts 98-467, § 9). Otherwise, section 200.5(4) itself did not expressly
contain an amortization period or grandfather clause. See id. For a further discus-
sion of amortization periods and grandfather clauses, see supra note 54 and accom-
panying text.
132. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1286-88.
133. See id. at 1286. The court added that these ordinances are constitutional
if they are "narrowly tailored to further a substantial government interest and 'al-
low for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.'" Id. For a discussion
on the time, place and manner test, see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
Ranch House argued that section 200.5(4) failed the time, place and manner test
because the First Amendment requires the inclusion of amortization or grandfa-
ther clauses to allow existing businesses time to conform to the zoning require-
ments. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1286. Ranch House argued that the absence
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had never previously ruled that the First Amendment requires the
inclusion of grandfather or amortization clauses in zoning regula-
tions.134 The court noted that other courts have assumed that these
zoning restrictions must include grandfather or amortization
clauses that are reasonable. 135 According to the court, determining
the reasonableness of these clauses should fall within the context of
as-applied challenges, not facial challenges.1 36
Because it was unclear to the court whether Ranch House
brought an as-applied challenge in reference to section 200.5(4),
the Eleventh Circuit remanded this issue to the district court for
resolution.' 3 7 Additionally, the court felt that remanding would al-
low the district court to engage in necessary fact-finding to deter-
mine the section 200.5(4) issue. 138
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S RATIONALE
The outcome in Ranch House exemplifies a court's difficulty in
ascertaining a legislature's intent.1 39 In light of the murky prece-
dent underlying the constitutionality of laws that regulate nude en-
tertainment, it is not surprising that the Eleventh Circuit declined
of these clauses would suppress protected speech and violate the First Amend-
ment. See id.
134. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1286. By citing a previous Eleventh Circuit
case, the court opined that the Constitution does not require the inclusion of
waiver provisions or grandfather clauses for existing businesses. See id. (citing
David Vincent, Inc. v. Broward County, 200 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)).
The Eleventh Circuit noted that courts have frequently upheld zoning ordinances
containing amortization periods. See id. (citing David Vincent, 200 F.3d at 1333
n.ll).
135. See id. at 1286. The court explained that in David Vincent, the zoning
provision included a five-year amortization clause, which was considered a reasona-
ble time period. See id. The court then pointed to a number of cases that have
assumed zoning laws targeting protected expression must include these clauses.
See id. at 1286-87.
136. See id. at 1287 (noting Ranch House's argument is better understood
under as-applied challenge and not facial challenge).
137. See id. The court refrained from offering an opinion on the merits of
Ranch House's argument. See id. The court stated that the constitutional founda-
tion for the requirement of amortization and grandfather clauses in zoning provi-
sions remained unclear, and therefore should be addressed on remand. See id.
138. See id. at 1287-88. The court felt that fact-finding was necessary to ad-
dress Ranch House's other arguments. See id. Specifically, Ranch House argued
that the lack of an amortization period would immediately require its business to
close, and this closing would deny the public access to protected nude entertain-
ment. See id. The court decided that this issue was for the district court to address
on remand. See id.
139. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1284 (deciding to remand to allow Alabama
Legislature opportunity to present case); see also Raban, supra note 34, at 576-77
(explaining difficulties courts have in determining legislature's intent).
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to strike down section 200.11 as unconstitutional. 140 Nonetheless,
there are several different routes that the Eleventh Circuit could
have taken in analyzing the constitutionality of the statute.' 4 1
A. Upholding Section 200.11
Although there was not an ample evidentiary showing in Ranch
House that section 200.11's purpose was to prevent the harmful sec-
ondary effects of nude entertainment, the court could have upheld
the statute under the Supreme Court's decisions in Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc. and City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. 1 42 Under Barnes, the Elev-
enth Circuit could have declared the statute to be a valid exercise of
police power, designed to protect public order and morality. 143 In
Barnes, the Supreme Court upheld a statute prohibiting all public
nudity, even without evidence of the Indiana Legislature's intent.' 4 4
The Court justified the statute solely because Indiana's past public
indecency statutes have historically been considered constitutional
attempts to protect societal order and morality.14 5 Applying this ra-
tionale, the Eleventh Circuit could have upheld section 200.11 with-
out an ample showing by the government of the statute's purpose.
A problem would arise in relying on Barnes, however, because
there the Indiana public indecency statute prohibited all nudity in
general. 146 Under the plurality's interpretation, the statute was not
directed at a particular form of nude expression because of a disa-
140. See Howard, supra note 5, at 897 (discussing confusion resulting from
Supreme Court's holding in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991)
(plurality opinion)).
141. For a discussion of the arguments in favor of section 200.11's constitu-
tionality, see infra notes 142-56 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
arguments favoring striking down the statute as unconstitutional, see infra notes
157-69 and accompanying text. Because section 200.11 was the defining issue in
the Eleventh Circuit's analysis and holding, this critical analysis will focus solely on
that section.
142. SeeWard v. County of Orange, 217 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1149 (2001) (citing Pap's to uphold zoning and licensing ordi-
nances aimed at negative secondary effects of adult establishments); Sammy's of
Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993, 997-98 (11th Cir. 1998) (using Barnes
analysis to uphold ordinance banning nude dancing in establishments selling
liquor).
143. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 569. In Barnes, the Supreme Court upheld a pub-
lic indecency statute that banned public nudity as an exercise of the police power
designed to protect morals and public order. See id.
144. See id. at 567-68 (applying O'Brien analysis to Indiana public indecency
law).
145. See id. at 568-69 (reviewing prior Indiana public indecency statutes).
146. See id. at 570-71 (noting that statute does not suppress erotic message).
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greement with its message. 147 In Ranch House, section 200.11 pro-
hibited nudity for entertainment purposes.1 48 Therefore, to avoid
the argument that section 200.11 was content-based, the Eleventh
Circuit would have had to rely on the Supreme Court's use of the
secondary effects doctrine in Pap's.14 9
Although the Eleventh Circuit did rely on Pap's in its opinion,
the context of this application flawed the court's reasoning.1 50 The
court cited Pap's to support its interpretation that precedent re-
quired a proper showing of legislative intent.151 The court also
noted that Justice Souter's concurrence in Barnes 52 did not help
Ranch House's argument because he retreated from that position
in Pap's.'5 3 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit failed to acknowledge
147. See id. In its explanation that the statute was not directed at nudity be-
cause of a disagreement with its message, the Court stated: "(t]he appearance of
people of all shapes, sizes and ages in the nude at a beach, for example, would
convey little if any erotic message, yet the State still seeks to prevent it." Id. at 571.
148. See Ranch House v. Amerson, Inc., 238 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2001)
(noting section 200.11 only targeted nude entertainment and not other nude
expression).
149. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 291 (2000) (plurality opin-
ion) (deciding ordinance, prohibiting public nudity, was justified because of its
focus on negative secondary effects of nude dancing); Colacurcio v. City of Kent,
163 F.3d 545, 553 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding ordinance imposing distance re-
quirements between nude dancers and patrons was constitutional without mention
of speech); Sammy's of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993, 999 (11th Cir.
1998) (finding ordinance banning nude dancing where alcohol was sold justified
by secondary effects doctrine).
150. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1282 n.4 (citing Pap's, 529 U.S. at 290).
151. See id. at 1282. In Pap's, the Supreme Court found that the preamble to
the ordinance was sufficient to establish that the legislative purpose was to prevent
the negative secondary effects associated with nude entertainment. See Pap's, 529
U.S. at 290. The preamble stated that the ordinance was adopted:
[Flor the purpose of limiting a recent increase in nude live entertain-
ment within the City, which activity adversely impacts and threatens to
impact on the public health, safety and welfare by providing an atmos-
phere conducive to violence, sexual harassment, public intoxication,
prostitution, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and other delete-
rious effects.
Id. Cf Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1281. In Ranch House, the legislative findings of
the bill adding section 200.11 were insufficient to determine whether the legisla-
ture's intent was aimed at secondary effects, although the Eleventh Circuit sug-
gested the intent was aimed at suppressing expression. See id. at 1281-82. For a
discussion of the findings, see supra note 119 and accompanying text.
152. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582-84 (1991) (Souter, J.,
concurring). In his concurrence in Barnes, Justice Souter felt that the government
did not have to provide affirmative evidence of an intent to combat harmful secon-
dary effects. See id. Several years later in Pap's, he disagreed with the plurality's
reasoning to uphold the regulation because he felt that the government did not
produce sufficient evidence tojustify the law. See Pap's, 529 U.S. at 310-11 (Souter,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1282 n.4. In a footnote, the Eleventh Circuit
acknowledged that Justice Souter departed from his Barnes concurrence in Pap's.
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that Justice Souter wrote a separate opinion in Pap's precisely be-
cause he felt that the plurality was incorrect in upholding the regu-
lation without a sufficient evidentiary showing of its purpose.1 5 4
Thus, the plurality in Pap's disregarded the need for an adequate
display of the regulation's purpose in upholding the regulation. 155
The Eleventh Circuit could have emphasized this aspect of the Pap's
decision heavily and upheld section 200.11 for targeting harmful
secondary effects, even without support in the record. Nonetheless,
the court instead chose to exercise caution by remanding in order
to provide the defendants a second chance to justify section
200.11.156
B. Striking Down Section 200.11
It would have been easier for the Eleventh Circuit to strike
down section 200.11. The court could have found the statute to be
unconstitutionally overbroad because it restricted both obscene
and non-obscene nude entertainment. 157
The Eleventh Circuit could have relied more heavily on the
Supreme Court's holding in Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim.158 In
Schad, the Court invalidated an ordinance that prohibited all live
entertainment in the borough, including nude dancing. 159 The
Court found that because the ordinance excluded both obscene
and non-obscene nude dancing, it could not pass intermediate
See id. The court decided it would not follow Justice Souter's approaches, but
would instead follow the approach of looking solely at the law to find the govern-
mental interest at stake, as the Supreme Court did in Renton. See id. The Eleventh
Circuit failed to mention that the plurality in Pap's upheld the ordinance without a
proper display of its purpose. See Pap's, 529 U.S. at 313-14 (Souter, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (noting plurality upheld ordinance without suffi-
cient evidence of its purpose).
154. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1282 n.4 (citing Pap's, 529 U.S. at 310-11
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
155. SeePap's, 529 U.S. at 313-14 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Souter noted that the plurality relied on the materials in the re-
cord, but those materials were not enough to justify the ordinance. See id. Justice
Souter added that the evidence considered must be "a matter of demonstrated
fact, not speculative supposition." Id. at 314.
156. See Ranch House, 238 F.3d at 1284.
157. See id. at 1281 (noting section 200.11 seemed to prohibit not only nudity
at adult-oriented businesses but also nudity showcased at theaters and money-mak-
ing entertainment venues).
158. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
159. See id. at 76 (concluding ordinance unconstitutional because no suffi-
cient alternatives of communication).
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scrutiny.160 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit could have adopted
the reasoning of Schad to strike down section 200.11.161
The Eleventh Circuit could have also cited the decisions of
other circuits to declare section 200.11 unconstitutionally over-
broad.16 2 In Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, the Sixth Circuit in-
validated an ordinance that banned all public nudity, including
non-adult nude entertainment. 63 The Sixth Circuit determined
that the City of Akron failed to show that non-adult entertainment
and harmful secondary effects were causally related, and accord-
ingly, found the ordinance unconstitutional. 164 Also, in BSA, Inc. v.
King County, the Ninth Circuit decided that two ordinances prohib-
iting barroom nude dancing were unconstitutional. 1 65 As the Sixth
Circuit did in Triplett, the Ninth Circuit found the ordinances over-
broad because they restricted nude expression protected by the
First Amendment. 16 6
The most powerful argument for finding section 200.11 viola-
tive of the First Amendment, therefore, is that it prohibits both un-
protected and protected expression. 1 6 7 AsJustice Souter remarked
about the statute in Barnes, "[i] t is difficult to see ... how the en-
forcement of Indiana's statute against nudity in a production of
'Hair' or 'Equus' . . . would further the State's interest in avoiding
harmful secondary effects .... ,,168 The Eleventh Circuit acknowl-
160. See id. (distinguishing Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 471 U.S. 50, 71 n.5
(1976)).
161. See BSA, Inc. v. King County, 804 F.2d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing
Schad to subject regulation banning nude dancing to strict scrutiny); Malmer, supra
note 53, at 1278 (discussing lower courts' reliance on Supreme Court's holding in
Schad).
162. See Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 135-36 (6th Cir.
1994) (striking down ordinance banning all public nudity); BSA, 804 F.2d at 1109
(holding ordinance prohibiting nude dancing violative of First Amendment).
163. See Triplett Grille, 40 F.3d at 135-36 (concluding ordinance prohibiting all
public nudity violated First Amendment because impermissibly overbroad).
164. See id. at 135. The Sixth Circuit noted that the ordinance prohibited "all
public nudity, including live performances with serious literary, artistic, or political
value." Id. at 136.
165. See BSA, 804 F.2d at 1110 (finding two counties' ordinances that regu-
lated barroom nude dancing substantially overbroad).
166. See id. The ordinances, which prohibited public nudity, excluded from
their reach nudity in expressive dance, drama, athletic locker rooms and science
and educational classes. See id. The Ninth Circuit found that by narrowing the
category of protected expression, the ordinances were substantially overbroad be-
cause non-obscene nudity was unprotected. See id.
167. See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76 (1981) (striking
down ordinance as overbroad because it prohibited both protected and non-pro-
tected expression).
168. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 585 n.2 (1991) (plurality
opinion) (Souter, J., concurring).
2002]
27
Schrack: Problems Ascertaining the Bare Meaning of Statutes Regulating Adu
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
414 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
edged this argument in its opinion, but should have relied more
heavily on Justice Souter's reasoning. 169 As a result, instead of re-
manding, the Eleventh Circuit could have struck down section
200.11 as unconstitutional.
VI. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN
RANCH HousE
The secondary effects doctrine has become the safety net for
legislatures enacting statutes that appear content-based.' 70 Along
with the holding in Ranch House, the doctrine gives legislatures wide
latitude in drafting laws that regulate adult entertainment. 171
Moreover, allowing legislatures another chance to explain their in-
tent can result in a showing of artificial intent.172 Although this
result may be mere speculation, the prospect of such occurrence is
reason for concern. 173
The Eleventh Circuit's holding in Ranch House also typifies the
deference courts tend to give legislative decisions by using the sec-
ondary effects doctrine.' 7 4 Moreover, the holding in Ranch House
demonstrates that a higher court's reliance on the secondary effects
doctrine will burden lower courts by requiring them to conduct fur-
169. See Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson, 238 F.3d 1273, 1285 (11th Cir. 2001)
(noting section 200.11 may prohibit nudity for non-adult entertainment
purposes).
170. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 323 (2000) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (arguing use of secondary effects doctrine allows government to totally
ban expression); Pollock, supra note 52, at 176 (arguing Pap's decision permits
government to ban clear expression upon showing some deleterious effects
involved).
171. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 323 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
argued that legislatures can justify laws banning expression because the negative
effects may only "happen to be associated" with the expression. Id.
172. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing legislatures may intend to sup-
press expression but courts will still continue to uphold law under secondary ef-
fects doctrine); Raban, supra note 34, at 566 (discussing unlikelihood of content-
based restrictions being solely directed at preventing other harms).
173. See Raban, supra note 34, at 569. Raban suggests that the secondary ef-
fects doctrine is faulty because it allows judges, not the legislature, to determine
the purpose of a regulation. See id. Raban argues "[n]othing more than a bare
determination by nonelected government officials that the purpose of a particular
regulation is acceptable distinguishes secondary-effects regulations from other reg-
ulations of speech." Id.
174. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (explaining princi-
ple of constitutional law that Court will not strike down statute based on illicit
motive); Raban, supra note 34, at 567 (arguing secondary effects doctrine allows
courts to simply allow content-based legislation to stand with nothing more than
cursory inquiry).
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ther inquiries into the legislature's intent.] 75 If the Eleventh Circuit
struck down the statute, the result would have ensured that legisla-
tures would pass carefully drawn laws. 176 In those cases, the impact
on legislatures would not be severe because they could simply re-
write the law. 177 Conversely, if a court upholds a statute such as
section 200.11 because it targets secondary effects, the implications
on First Amendment jurisprudence would be severe. 178 With the
Eleventh Circuit's reluctance to decide the constitutionality of the
statutes in Ranch House, courts will continue to rely too heavily on
the secondary effects doctrine. 179
Thomas Schrack
175. See Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1200-03 (N.D.
Ala. 2001) (conducting review to determine whether section 200.11 targeted nega-
tive secondary effects). On remand, the district court upheld section 200.11 as
targeting harmful secondary effects because of testimony by the senator that spon-
sored the bill adding the statute. See id. at 1202. The court found the testimony of
Alabama State Senator Tom Butler credible. See id. Senator Butler testified that
he sponsored the bill because of "problems that had been growing in Madison
County since about 1991 with the proliferation of clubs outside the corporate lim-
its of Huntsville to the rural areas." Id. at 1189-90. He also obtained reports from
the Madison County sheriff that explained emergency responses from club-related
occurrences. See id. at 1190. The district court relied on this testimony and the
reports to uphold section 200.11, finding it targeted the harmful secondary effects
of nude dancing. See id. at 1202. The court also upheld section 200.5(4) as facially
constitutional as-applied to Ranch House because it left open reasonable means of
communication. See id. at 1212-13; see also Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d
164, 173 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc) (remanding to determine whether ordinance
justified without reference to speech).
176. See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 79 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (noting ordinance not carefully drawn to pass as sufficient justifica-
tion for restricting protected expression).
177. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 594 (1991) (plurality opin-
ion) (White, J., dissenting) (stating legislatures should adopt restrictions narrowly
drawn that allow expressiveness of non-obscene entertainment).
178. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 322 (2000) (plurality opin-
ion) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (explaining use of secondary effects rationale to allow
total ban on expression has serious impact on First Amendment principles); see also
Note, supra note 4, at 1920 (arguing limitation on secondary effects doctrine fur-
thers goals of Court's approach to First Amendment questions).
179. See Pap's, 529 U.S. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing secondary ef-
fects doctrine not intended to justify total bans on expression); Pollock, supra note
52, at 176 (arguing secondary effects doctrine applied in areas that creators did
not imagine); see also Note, supra note 4, at 1922-23 (arguing courts' misuse of
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